1. lntroduction: the ever modern is sue of bureaucratic dominance ln this essay we will try to explain the increasing dominance of the state bureaucracy in developing countries. ln so far as the question is confined to the study of the bureaucracy dominance in developing countries, it could lead one to think that the problem does not exist in developed countries. "ln Western countries" ,wrote FRED RlGGS, "it had become a habit to think of the bureaucracy as an instrumental apparatus for the execution of policies established through 'politicai', non,bureaucratic institutions. There have, of course, been serious scholars f as well as emotional writers, who have stressed the difficulty of keeping bureaucrats under control or, as the administrative cliché has it, 'on tap but not on top'." 2 A consequence of this conventional attitude was that relatively few scholars devoted themselves to an analysis of the politicai role of bureaucrats, even as far as developing countries are concerned. However, nowadays, it seem to be widely accepted that the bureaucracy has influence in politics ,although the extent of such influence varies from precious little to great deal. A second common belief of present times is that in developing countries ~compareci with developed countries, the extent of bureaucratic involvement in politics is exceptionally high. This makes the study of the dominance of state bureaucracy in the former a more important task. lt is worth noting that this idea of officials holding real politicai power over society can be traced back to the very invention of the term bureaucracy, by the middle of the 18th century. To the word bureau ,already meaning a place where Officials worked, the French writer VlNCENT DE JOURNAY added the Greek suffix cratàs, which signifies rule or power, intending to reveal the existence of a fourth or fifth form of government (besides monarchy, aristocracy and democracy). The Dictionary of the French Academy accepted the word in its 1 798 supplement and defined it as: "Power, influence of the heads and staff of government bureaux". ln 1813 the word was already in a German dictionary of foreign expressions defined as "The authority or power which various government departments and their branches arrogate to themselves over fellow citizens" 3 • The problem we are concerned about here, was clearly there: the dominance of the state officials.
2 See Fred W. RIGGS, "Bureaucrats and Politica/ Deve/opment: A Paradoxica/ View", in Bureaucracy and Politicai Development, ed. by Joseph LA PALOMBARA, Princeton University Press, 1971, p.120-121 . 3 The story of the invention of the word "bureaucratic", which soon acquired wide popularity-the term easily underwent the sarne transliterations as "democracy" or "aristocracy"-is told by Martin ALBROW}
The lncreasing Dorninance Of The State Bureaucracy in Developing 159 Countries 2. Concepts ofbureaucracy: two different perspectives ln order to answer the proposed question, the first and unavoidable step should be to define the key concept used in it, i. e., bureaucracy. That is not an easy task, since each writer has his own way of understanding bureaucracy, apart from the ideological~ l.aden aspect of the problem. Nevertheless, trying to show the extreme diversity of definitions of bureaucracy as briefly as possible, we will group them in two categories: (a) the definitions relating bureaucracy to administration, and (b) those relating bureaucracy to organization, following an increasing levei of generality.
There are three different kinds of definitions relating bureaucracy to administration. Firstly, the old etymological definition we have already referred to above: bureaucracy as the "rule by officials". This is not only a historical definition, since it was endorsed ~between the two wars~ by some notable thinkers (H. LASKI, H. FINER, W R. SHARP and D. WARNOTTE among them)
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• Let us take, for instance, LASKI's influential definition: "Bureaucracy is the term usually applied to a system of government the control of which is so completely in the hands of officials that their power jeopardizes the liberties of ordinary citizens" 5 • As an outgrowth of this original definition a second concept was elaborated: bureaucracy would not indica te any more the "rule by officials", but the group itself of officials which exerts some control over the state apparatus. RIGGS expressed this concept defining bureaucracy in very simple words: "the formal hierarchy of government officials" 6 • Thirdly, we have the Weberian classical definition of bureaucracy: as the previous, he relates bureaucracy to administration, but does not confine it to the state machinery. Bureaucracy would be simply "administration by appointed officials", which applies not only to government officials, but to any organization where the staffs are made up of appointees." 7 There are other three kínds of definitions which ~in broader terms-relate bureaucracy to organization. The first tendency (owing great deal to the "ideal type" ofbureaucracy proposed by Weber) sees in the concept ofbureaucracy all the virtues of a "rational" organisation. Bureaucracy ~defined by PETER BLAU~ is the "organisation that maximizes efficiency in administration or an institutionalised method of organized social conduct in the interests of administrative efficiency" 8 • At variance with this "positive" tendency is the "negative" one led by M. CROZIER and others, who define bureaucracy as the "inefficient organization". 9 Close to the popular sense of the word, (Bureaucracy, London, MacMillan, 1970, pp.16-18 Whatever the definition of bureaucracy we prefer, it seems, that there is no choice when the concernis bureaucratic participation in the formation of public policies. ln this case , and it is precisely the case of the present essay , the relevant concept is the restrictive one, which confines bureaucracy to the public servants, or governmental administra tive components of politicai systems.
That seems to be the çonclusion of the main writers in studies of developing sodeties. It is common to most of the essays in La PALOMBARA's collection Bureaucracy and Politicai Development, explicitly in RlGGs' and DORSEY's.
11 Even LA P ALOMBARA wrote that:
"By and large, however, the bureaucrats of major interest to us are generally those who occupy managerial roles, who are in some directive capacity either in central agencies or in the field, who are generally described in the language of public administration as "middle" or "top" management. The reason for this more restrictive use is selfevident: the managerial group in the bureaucracy is more likely to have a direct bearing on politicai and other kinds of national development" .
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The sarne opinion is shared by FERREL HEADYY ln fact, this restrictive concept of bureaucracy is exactly what the authors name "state bureaucracy" and which appears in the title of this essay. ln principie, the military fit the concept of state bureaucracy. However, it is the London, Prentice Hall, 1966, p.17-18, and ALBROW, op.cit., pp. 89-90 10 About the "dominant tendency" see HEADY, Op. cit., pp.17 and 20; and ALBROW, op.cit. pp. 100-102. 11 RIGGS, essay cit., Loc. cit., John DORSEY, in the same collection, "The Bureaucracy and Politicai Development in Vietnam", P.322. 12 LA PALOMBARA, Ope ci t., p.7 13 HEADY, op.cit., p.22 Countries usual convention in public administration literature to concentrare on the civil, rather than the military bureaucracy, which is left to the politicai science. We would not like to break the convention. But it is worth noting with MERLE FAINSOD that military govemments are driven to rely heavily on the civil service. The experience has shown that "the transfer of power from politician,dominated regime to a military regime may have the paradoxical result of reinforcing the influence and the authority of civilian administrators" . 14 Anyway, a military government is a very good example ofbureaucratic dominance, to the extent which the military organization is also part of the public bureaucracy.
Should the "politicai elite" be included in the concept of state bureaucracy? Considering the aims of the present exercise we would answer negatively~ ln fact, our concern here is the increasing dominance of the state bureaucracy. lt implies the ide a that the state bureaucrats are "invading" a field t,hat does not belong to them by right, namely the politicai decision,making. lt also implies that the politicai control over the state bureaucracy is increasingly weak and ineffective. Those assumptions require the existence outside the bureaucracy of a politicai elite, whose legitima te claim to exerting politicai power is increasingly threatened or diminished in reality. For these reasons we will distinguish the politicai elite from the state bureaucracy.
Nevertheless it should be recognised that the politicai elite can constitute itself a bureaucracy, at least as dominant as the state bureaucracy may be. This seems to be the case of a totalitarian party system, where the sole party, at least in theory, controls the state bureaucracy, but is itself an almighty bureaucracy, beyond any control by the ordinary members of the community. On the other hand, as FAINSOD admits the state bureaucracy itself can be the ruling element in the politicai system, the very politicai elite, what appears to have happened in certain phases of colonial rule. 
State Bureaucracy and Western Civilization: the Weberian model
The state bureaucracy is undoubtedly a product of a long politicai evaluation of the Western civilization, which emerged after the fall of the Roman Empire. And it was not until the end of the 17th century that something like the state bureaucracy, as we now know, showed its early signs.
Many historical factors had prepared the rise of the state bureaucracies: first of all, the creation of the nation~state, starting from the 15th and 16th centuries, with the invention of the centralized nationwide administration, the government through papers and the formal instrument of the written law, alllaid down by the monarchical absolutism; secondly, some basic achievements of the liberalism, such as the principies of national sovereignty (meaning the state depersonalisation, with the Nation replacing the King as the source of power and the basis o~ civil service)
16 , the primacy ofLaw (as expression of the general will) and the "plebiscitarianism" (meaning that "all powers intervening between the individual and the state must be destroyed ~ such as estates and corporations, etc. ~ so that all citizens as individuais possess equal rights before the sovereign, national authority"); 17 and, finally, some economic conditions such as the development of a money economy, the industrial revolution and the very capitalist system, with the separation between the worker ~ and the employee in general ~ and the means of production.
Without those premises the state bureaucracy, as well as the other bureaucracies ~ would not have appeared and developed. It was Weber who best described the main "ideal" characteristics of the new pattern of organization: (1) defined rights and duties, whi.ch are prescribed in written regulations; (2) authority relations between positions, which are ordered systematically; (3) appointment and promotion, which are regulated and are based on contractual agreement; (4) technical training (or experience) as a formal condition of employment; (5) fixed monetary salaries; (6) a strict separation of office and incumbent in the sense that the employee does not own the "means of production"; and (7) administrative work as a full~time occupation.
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ln spite of the common background, the Western countries revealed two different bureaucratic systems. On one hand, in England and in the U.S.A., the democratic politicai institutions developed before the bureaucratic expansion, so that the state bureaucracy would be limited and con~ trolled by politicai institutions from the cradle and throughout its pro~ cess of growth. On the other hand, in France ~and especially in Germany~ the bureaucracy to a certain extent preceded the politicai institutions: the very national power was consolidated through a pre~existent bureaucratic apparatus, and this may perhaps explain the strength and relative dominance historically showed by French and German bureaucracies.
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Even considering the "natural" formation of the Western State bureaucracies, the fact that they tended to acquire increasing power did not escape Weber's observation. 16 First, because they developed technical and essential knowledge in order to administra te in the new environment. Secondy, because they accumulated information much of it denied to the rest of the community. But Weber believed that the bureaucracies could be prevented from reaching the point where they controlled the policy and action of the organization they were supposed to serve, since mechanisms for limiting their scope were established. 20 5. The Spread ofWestern Civilization: the peripheral World drama Fortunately or unfortunately, development ultimately means "modernization" and "modernization" ultimately means "Westernisation".
21 By saying this we do not mean that development should be moulded in the Western Europe experience, nor should it lead to a predetermined Western,country economic stage; but that development, as the human mastering of nature through science and technology to improve the "well,being" of all members of society , is itself a Western ideal, whether capitalist, socialist or communist the process may be; and, moreover, that it is impossible to be attained unless situated inthe ideological and technological Western context. The Western civilization ,pushed by the "catholic" 22 vocation that is inherent in its economic, social and philosophical spirit, spread out all over the world. If one attends to that the ideologies and the external form (institutions) of the Western civilization are much easier to be assimilated than its inner cultural core ,which was the very cause of Western development, then one starts to understand the drama of the peripheral world. The "developing" situation is a direct result of the Western impact on "traditional" 23 countries and can essentially be explained as a pervasive imbalance between the Westernised institutions plus the socio,economic values formally adopted by the upper sections of society, and its resistant traditional inner structures and values. Demographic explosion, appalling unemployment, disruption of the agricultura! sector, 20 See ALBROW, op.cit., pp. 46 and 47 21 '" Modern' means being Western without depending on the West. The model of modernity is a picture of the West detached in some way from its geographical setting; it permits Soviet Russia and China to affirm ideais with a Western content while they remain politically and emotionally anti-Western. This is what "being modern" has meant to the elites of the new states. The new states are in their eyes not yet modern ... The image of the Western countries and the partia! in-corporation and transformation of that image in the Soviet Union provida the standards and models in the light of which the elites of the new states of Asia and Africa seek to reshape themselves. (Edward SHILS. Center and Periphery: Essays in Microsociology. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1975, p.486) 22 "Catholic" here is used in the etymological sense of the term, which means "universal", or "directed to the world as a whole" 23 We follow here SHIL's definition: "By traditional is meant the salience of lineage, the widespreadness of religious belief, simple technology, illiteracy. The most significant fact is that their central politicai traditions do not include those of democratic, representativa, constitutional government". Cop.cit. loc.cit.) are concrete aspects of this fundamental disequilibria. So it is the increasing dominance of the state bureaucracy, as we will see.
Perhaps the most characteristic sign of the Western expansion was the import ~ by the peripherical world ~ of the Western State bureaucracy. We tried to create a sort of classification of the ways by which this institu~ tion transfer has happened, in three different types: (a) "Transplantation", (b) "Transformation", and (c) "Transaction".
The "transplantation" happened in Latin America, during the last century, under the prevailing ideology ofliberalism. By this type we mean two realities: (1) the creation of a machinery not existing before, following the Spanish and Portuguese patterns; and (2) the cultural identity of the state bureaucratic elite with the cultural basis of the imported model. Taking for granted this identity, why did this transfer bring about a traditional~orientated bureauçracy and not the successful modem~ oriented bureaucracy which resulted from the British transplanting to the U.S.A., Canada and Australia? The reasons are twofold: firstly, ~he administrative system established in Latin America has its roots in the 16th century "traditional" Spain and Portugal. Secondly ~ and more important ~ in Latin America we had the transplant of institutions, with the pre~ determined task of creating a society, whereas in countries such as the U.S.A./Canada and Australia, the society itself was transplanted and the bureaucratic institutions were created and developed from the society.
ln As ia and the Middle East, roughly speaking, happened a "transformation" of institutions. By this we mean: (I) not the creation but the Westernization of a machinery already existent in many places; and (2) the bureaucratic elite comes from the indigenous culture, although it has under~ gone a process of "westernization". ln the sub~Saharan Africa it is happening an intermediate process of transfer we called "transaction", in wich:
(1) as in Latin America, no machinery existed before; (2) but as in Asia and Middle East, the bureaucratic elite has its origin in the indigenous culture. ln Asia and Africa "transformation" and "transaction" are happening in this century, so that they would show the influence of socialist prevailing environment. On the other hand the antagonism between the indigenous elite and the ex~colonial elite made likelier the use of the Western modelas reflected in the Soviet~Union and China, because of their anti~Western rhetoric.
We will now proceed with a systematic discussion of those reasons explaining the dominance of rhe state bureaucracy in developing countries.
First reason: the State primacy Countries
There is a common agreement ,transcending politicai ideologies, culture and style, that bureaucracy should be basically instrumental, which is based on the Western experience and implies the affirmation of politicai control over the administrative system, whatever the character of the politicai leadership. Of course, this does not mean that bureaucracy can or should play strictly this instrumental role. 24 However, in developing countries even this relative instrumental feature, i.e., the politicai control over bureaucracy, seems elusive. It seems to exista tendency ofbureaucratic dominance.
We believe that the first explanation for this dominance should be found in a common fact showed in all the three kinds of institution transfer referred to above: i.e., the primacy of the State in the politicai formation of the developing countries, as well as in promoting economic and social change.
ln Latin America and Africa the pre,existence of the State in relation to the national society was radical. The countries in those areas had State before having had people in the politicai sense of the word. Moreover, not only ill the State come before the nation, as such, was constituted; but, the State was the instrument through which the nationalities were built (ar have been built). What a difference if we compare with the Western politicai reality , which has in the U.S.A. the outmost example , where the people (as a national community), not only existed before the setting,up of politicai structures, but ,through a constitutional pact, created the politicai apparatus (the United States of America).
There is still the task of socio,economic development, which in Western Europe resulted mainly from priva te efforts, but in the Third World, it seems today very clear , can only be achieved if the State takes the lead. ln Latin America, the State this century is facing the economic challenge after having solved the national problem in the last one. But what to say about Africa where the State leadership have to face both problems at the sarne time? It is not enough to strive for economic development: they have also to try to maintain the national unity.
ln Asia, the antecedence of the State does not look so evident, but still exists in so far the State leadership has been the agent of politicai modernization and ,as in the other areas, of socio,economic development.
The primacy of the State we think is the best explanation for the fundamental fact, noted three times at least by Heady in his book, and also by Riggs as causing the state bureaucracy dominance: "the weakness of (the transitional societies) extra, bureaucratic politicai institutions" , 25 o r that "groups capable of competing for politicai influence or of imposing dose controls over the bureaucracy are few and far behind, so 166 Cezar Saldanha Souza J r. that often it is able to move into a partial power vacuum". 26 So, in a pre,existent,formative state, the bureaucracy assumes the role ofkey,institution which the politicalleader has to rely absolutely upon. The bureaucracy can become itself the ruling group.
A Brazilian writer on his country's bureaucracy,2 7 arrived at the sarne conclusion Riggs clearly expounds: "premature or too rapid expansion of (State) bureaucracy when the politicai system lags behind tends to inhibit the development of effective politics".
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The pre,existence of a formative state, with all its bureaucratic apparatus, inhibits the development of the public opinion, politicai parties, independent pressure groups, authentic Parliamentary institutions and so forth. This lack of strong popular politicai institutins generates a politicai vacuum, where the state bureaucracy can operate with almost no control at all (unless a one,party system full of vi tali ty is created to accomplish this function). The lack of control, ultimately, leads to the dominance of the state bureaucracy over society.
7. The second reason: "the praetorian society".
As we have already analysed, the State primacy in developing countries tends to hinder the development oflegitimate politicai institutions, creating a sort of politicai vacuum. ln such societies, when social and economic development widens the r4nge of politicai participation, allowing emerging groups to put forward their demands to the politicai system, we have a situation Huntington calls "praetorianism".
The praetorian society can be described as the politicai community where does not exist consensus about the institutions, leadership, and methods, which must serve as intermediaries to modera te and solve conflicts. ln such society forces confront each other nakedly, with their own actors and through their peculiar methods. "The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrare; and military coup".
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Therefore, praetorian societies are characterized by permanent instability, politicai disorder, and weak as well as ineffective govemments. There are few alternatives for this situation: either the disorder and in, stability persists till a revolution arises to reshape the all society, or the military coup, trying to remedy the situation. However, if they are not able to create legitima te politicai institutions, the situation will deteriorare Countries from coup to coup till a revolution eventually happens.
ln the case of a military government being established, we will have a state bureaucracy rule perhaps in its clearest way. The civil state bureaucracy rllllargely profit from the situation, in so far as the military are forced to rely heavily on the civil service to remain in power. 30 A coalition is created where the military will use the civil servants to be able to govern, and the civil bureaucrats will use the military politicai power to increase their privileges and their participation in policy decision,making.
On the other hand, as longas the situation of disorder and instability under weak governments goes on, the high raru {s of the civil service also will tend to benefit: in an environment of tough competition they are not only the group closest to the centre of decisions, but they are the only group there (besides the military) who are permanent in their positions.
Thus we conclude that "praetorianism" is another important cause explaining why in most developing countries the state bureaucracy plays an increasing dominant role.
8. The third reason: "the prismatic society".
To the bureaucratic dominance in developing countries we presented till now two explanations: one related with the politicai formation, and the other with the politicai structure of development societies. Let us add another explanation which takes into account the socio,administrative system as such, that is to say, the Riggs' "prismatic model".
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As all post, Rostowians, Riggs departs from the classification of societies in "traditional" ( =not industrial), "transitional" ( =striving to speed up industrialization) and "modern" societies ( = relatively industrialised). As far as the social,administrative system of those countries is concerned, he distinguishes three different models, the "fused", the "prismatic" and the "diffracted" (the terminology is taken from physics and the analysis of light), each one correlated respectively with the traditional, the transitional and the modern types of societies. The models are defined in terms of the number of functions performed by the social, administrative structures (by "structure" he means any pattern of behaviour which has become a standard feature of a social system, for instance a government bureau). ln the fused model each structure in the system tends to perform a large number of diffuse functions; at the other extreme of the spectrum ( the diffracted model) each structure tends to perform limited number of especific functions; by the middle of the spectrum in the "prismatic" model, where the structures , like a prism, have started the diffraction process but it remains incomplete. lt is very interesting his analysis on the dinamics of changes leading from a traditional to a modern, through a transitional society (process which he does not consider inevitable, no r necessarily destined to success). The process of "diffraction" may have been produced, either (1) by an agressive internal middle,class which had to fight against the power of the aristocratic elites in response to pressures for chance, grown largely from within; or, (2) by the elites themselves, subject to compelling external pressures , in our language the "expansion of Western Civilization" , which forced them to take the lead in launching risky and even potentially suicidai processes of change. (Elites not subject to such pressures would have few incentives to lead the way on such a dangerous journey). The first pr~cess (he called "endo,prismatic") can only be found in the pre,modern societies ofEurope, such as England, France, Holland, where the scientific and industrial revolution took place. The second one (the "exo, prismatic" process) marks the changes of the contemporary non,Western transitional countries. To study today's developing countries is to study the "exo,prismatic diffraction" process.
His description of the external impact of the "diffracted" civilization on the elites of the fused societies (both the old established or the newly independent) is exciting: the primary stimulus seems to be the problem of defense; the need for adopting modern weapons and military organization, as well as reshaping profoundly the civil bureaucracy, in order to maintain the independence of the country they rule, and which they feel threatened by superior organization and weapons which cannot be resisted by bows and arrows. The consolidation of the whole bureaucratic apparatus, on one hand requires health and education facilities, power stations, roads and so forth, and on the other economic activities to pay for those large expenditures. This is the way the "diffraction" normally starts: from top to bottom, by the state elite through the State bureaucracy. Now we can situate the problem of the bureaucracy power. ln a traditional, fused society, the State bureaucracy , when it can be said that it really exists , is controlled by the "aristocratic" politicai elite and subject to it. ln a modern,diffracted society, the state bureaucracy is so specialised and interacts in such a way with the wide range of strong competing groups and complex non,State bureaucracies, that the politicai institutions, whether pluralist or totalitarian, are in a good position to control and limit the power of the bureaucracy. However, and now we will quote RlGGS, "lt is precisely in the prismatic situation that bureaucratic power is most likely in them. It is in the second category that the control over the bureaucracy are weakest and the risks of indefinite bureaucratic power dominance are greatest. The lack of legitimacy compels the ruling group to woo the support of the state bureaucracy in order to materialise their rule. It is a coalition where the state bureaucracy has great bargaining power.
O. Conclusion
We tried to show why the state bureaucracy (the group occupying managerial roles and being in some directive capacity in the public administration) has a dominant position (in developing nations) totally unacceptable, to the vast majority of developed countries' standards. Among the possible reasons, we pointed out: (a) the politicai imbalance caused by the spread of the Western Civilization in regions lacking the basic conditions to assimila te its inner culture;-(b) the primacy of the state in building nationalities and in promoting development in the Third World; (c) the "praetorianism", or the inexistence oflegitimate institutions to media te conflicts and reconcile demands; (d) the "exo~prismatic" socio~administrative system, where the function~specialization of the structures has not yet been completed; and (e) the authoritarianism of the politicai regime, especially in the case of military dictatorships.
Finally, we avoided judgement about the implications of this inordinately strong position of the state bureaucracy, knowing the dispute between the prevalent negative view (La Palombara, Riggs and Goodnow, for instance), 36 
